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An index developed by the authors is used to track the U.S. dollar’s performance against a number
of foreign currencies. The authors’comparison of the index with the relative export growth rates
of Japan and Germany suggests that in the 1990s the dollar stayed near levels that put the
United States and its main export rivals on an equal footing. Nevertheless, the dollar’s rise in
1997, if sustained, will make it more difficult for U.S. firms to keep pace with their competitors.
We find that the dramatic swings in the price competi-
tiveness of U.S. exports in the 1980s have been followed
by a relatively stable level of price competitiveness in the
1990s. The dollar’s sharp run-up during the first half of
the 1980s had a significant negative impact on U.S. foreign
sales relative to those of Germany and Japan, while the
dollar’s fall in the latter half helped U.S. firms regain
market share. In the 1990s, exchange rates and relative
inflation rates have been much more stable, holding to
levels that have enabled all three countries to enjoy similar
export growth rates. The key exception is that U.S.
exports have done much better in Canada and Mexico
because of trade liberalization efforts. More recently, the
dollar’s rise in 1997 has hurt U.S. price competitiveness,
although the appreciation has been fairly modest compared
with that recorded in the 1980s.
Measuring Price Competitiveness
Exchange Rates and Inflation Rates. Nominal
exchange rate movements and domestic inflation rates are
the fundamental determinants of price competitiveness. In
the case of exchange rates, consider a consumer deciding
whether to purchase a certain good from a U.S. or a
Japanese producer. To identify the better deal, the consumer
will compare the prices of the two goods in a common
currency—say, U.S. dollars. The current nominal yen-dollar
exchange rate is used by the consumer to convert the yen
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Assessing a nation’s price competitiveness in the world
markets is an elusive exercise. When U.S. dollar
exchange rates fluctuate significantly, as they did in
1997, policymakers want to track the effects on their
country’s competitive position, because international
trade can be a major determinant of economic growth.
But how can policymakers gauge the extent to which
competitiveness is improving or worsening? One common
indicator is a dollar index, which is calculated using
exchange rate and price data for a selected group of
countries. Such an index measures how a currency
depreciation or an improved inflation performance can
enhance a country’s competitiveness.
In this edition of Current Issues, we construct a dollar
index to assess the price competitiveness of U.S.
exports since 1980. Our index allows us to quantify
changes in the prices of U.S. goods relative to the prices
of competing foreign-produced goods in the world
markets. We begin by looking at the price competitiveness
of U.S. and Japanese producers to clarify the construction
and usefulness of the index. We then provide some
insight into how the index is linked to exports by com-
paring the growth rate of U.S. exports to major markets
with the corresponding export growth rates for Japan
and Germany—two prominent industrial-economy
exporters and the nation’s main competitors in the
world markets.price of the Japanese-produced good into dollars. This
relative price will guide the purchase decision and thus
serve as an indicator of the price competitiveness of the
U.S. and Japanese producers. Fluctuations in the nominal
yen-dollar exchange rate will alter the relative price of the
good and thus alter the competitiveness of the producers
in the two countries.
Changes in the prices of domestically produced goods
can affect a nation’s competitiveness in the same way as a
currency fluctuation. For instance, rising domestic prices
for either U.S. or Japanese goods for any given nominal
yen-dollar exchange rate will raise the goods’ prices in
dollar terms. The country with the lower inflation rate will
therefore see its goods becoming relatively less expensive
in dollar terms, and these falling relative prices will signal
an improvement in its competitiveness.
It is important to consider both nominal exchange rates
and inflation when measuring price competitiveness. For
example, the nominal yen in 1997 was roughly 40 percent
stronger against the dollar than it had been in 1980—a
change that would seem to place Japanese exporters at a
sizable disadvantage relative to their U.S. counterparts.
However, when we also consider the inflation factor, we
find that much of the nominal yen’s strength has been
offset over this period. The real yen—the nominal yen
adjusted for inflation—was only 12 percent stronger
against the dollar, because Japan experienced less
inflation than the United States between 1980 and 1997
(Chart 1).1 Japan’s competitive disadvantage was there-
fore not as large as suggested by exchange rates alone.
A Trade-Weighted Dollar Index. To assess U.S. price
competitiveness overall, one needs to measure not only the
dollar’s value against a single currency, but also its value
against the currencies of other industrial and newly industri-
alizing countries that trade and compete with the United
States. Such an assessment can be made by constructing a
trade-weighted dollar index that averages exchange rate and
price data for selected countries, with the weights based on
each country’s relative importance to the U.S. economy.2We
have devised such an index, which includes the currencies
of thirteen industrial countries and four newly industrializ-
ing Asian economies (see box). What distinguishes the latter
economies—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan—from other developing countries is their produc-
tion of a broad array of goods that compete directly with
U.S.-made products. Another important feature of our index
is that the weights given to each currency are allowed to
vary over time to reflect changing trade patterns.
Our trade-weighted dollar index shows the large swing in
the dollar’s value during the 1980s and its relative stability
in the 1990s (Chart 2). The index starts in 1980 at roughly
100, then rises steeply to reach an average of 135 in 1985.
This means that, on average, the dollar price of goods that
make up the U.S. producer price index increased 35 percent
against a weighted average of goods in foreign producer
price indexes. The dollar fell sharply starting in 1985, and
by 1988 was hovering around 100. It has since experienced
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Index: 1990=100
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Chart 1
Yen-Dollar Exchange Rates
Notes:  Real exchange rates are deflated by the Japanese wholesale price index
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To assess U.S. price competitiveness
overall, one needs to measure not only
the dollar’s value against a single
currency, but also its value against
the currencies of other industrial
and newly industrializing countries that
trade and compete with the United States.more modest swings, showing particular weakness in 1995
when the index dropped to 90 and strength in 1997 when the
index approached 115 at the end of the year. While this
recent upturn represents a significant deviation from the
1990-97 average of roughly 100, the index is still well below
the high levels recorded in the mid-1980s.
Relative Export Growth
Having calculated a trade-weighted dollar index, how do
we interpret whether a particular index value is favorable
to U.S. firms? One method would be to compare overall
U.S. export growth with that of the nation’s major foreign
competitors. But using aggregate growth rates to evalu-
ate export performance can sometimes be misleading.
For instance, relatively slack economic activity in one
foreign market will restrain exports to that market from
all countries. In the 1990s, Europe experienced slow
growth. Since Germany is much more dependent on this
market than Japan or the United States, its overall
export growth suffered relative to that of these two
3
Constructing the Trade-Weighted Dollar Index
Our index is a trade-weighted average of seventeen
major currency values. The method used to construct
the index is similar to that used for other real dollar
indexes; however, the currencies, weights, and price
data used differ.a
• The  currencies used are from thirteen
developed countries (ten European coun-
tries and Australia, Canada, and Japan) and
from Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea,
and Taiwan.b
• The weights used are based on averages of
import and export shares. These averages
are allowed to change over time.c The
import weights are each country’s share of
U.S. imports. The export component is
made up of two equal parts: the share of
U.S. exports to each country and each coun-
try’s share of world exports (excluding
sales to the United States). The import and
export components are themselves then
weighted by the share of each in total U.S.
trade (see box table).
• We use wholesale and producer price data to
calculate a real exchange rate. The real rate is
essentially an index of exchange rates divided
by a similarly constructed index of U.S. and
foreign prices, with price ratios replacing
exchange rate values in the calculation.
How the Dollar Index Trade Weights Are Calculated
1990-95 Data
Share of Share of Share of
U.S. U.S. World Trade
Imports Exports Exports* Weights
Country (1) (2) (3) (4)
Australia 1.0 2.8  2.0 1.6
Belgium 1.3 3.2  6.0 2.7
Canada 27.3 31.3  1.4 22.9
France 3.9 4.3  10.6 5.4
Germany 7.6 6.2  18.6 9.6
Hong Kong 2.6  3.2  5.0  3.2
Ireland 0.6 1.0 1.4 0.8
Italy 3.5 2.4  8.2 4.3
Japan 26.6 15.8  12.5 21.1
Netherlands 1.4 4.3  6.6 3.2
Singapore 3.1 3.5  3.1 3.3
South Korea 4.7  5.3  3.3  4.5
Spain 0.8 1.5  3.2 1.5
Sweden 1.3 0.9  2.6 1.5
Switzerland 1.5 1.7  3.0 1.9
Taiwan 6.6 4.9  4.2 5.6
United Kingdom 6.2  7.7  8.3  6.9
Total 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0
Note: To calculate the trade weight for each country (column 4), we first
multiply the value in column 1 by imports’share of total U.S. trade
(58 percent) and the values in columns 2 and 3 by exports’share of total U.S.
trade (42 percent, here divided equally between the share of U.S. exports to
the country and the country’s share of world exports). We then sum these
products. The trade rate for Australia, for example, is computed
as follows: 1.0 x .58 + 2.8 x .21 + 2.0 x .21 = 1.6.
* Excludes sales to the United States.
a The Federal Reserve System offers alternative dollar indexes. For instance, the Board of Governors’index uses the currencies of eleven
major developed countries and relies on fixed multilateral weights, deflated by the consumer price index. The Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas has 150 exchange rates in its index and uses bilateral weights, deflated by consumer prices. The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
produces a dollar index similar to the one constructed here, but it is not adjusted for price movements. 
b China and Mexico are two major trading partners that are not included. Goods from these countries, as well as from smaller developing
Asian economies, generally do not compete with goods produced in the United States. 
c The averages for each year—known as five-year moving averages—are essentially based on trade flows over the most recent five years
for which data are available.countries. Thus, a look at aggregated growth rates
would erroneously imply a loss of competitiveness of
German firms. Instead, it would be better to compare
how all three countries did individually in their sales to
Europe. For example, if German exports to Europe were
weak, but so were those from Japan and the United
States, then the inference to draw is that demand fac-
tors—rather than price competitiveness—are driving
relative export performance.
By comparing U.S. export growth rates to specific
foreign markets with the export growth rates of Japan
and Germany to the same markets, we obtain a more
accurate reading of the competitiveness of U.S.
exporters between 1980 and the first three quarters of
1997 (see table). Such a comparison reveals that the dol-
lar’s appreciation in the first half of the 1980s hit U.S.
exports hard. In volume terms, sales were down to all
major markets except Canada, with particularly steep
drops evident in sales to Latin America (down 36 per-
cent) and Europe (down 27 percent).3 Conversely,
German and Japanese firms enjoyed robust growth in
every major market except Mexico and Latin America.
Even in the Latin American market, where economic
turmoil hurt all exporters, the weakness of the mark and
yen helped to keep German and Japanese exports from
falling as steeply as U.S. exports.
The sharp fall in the dollar starting in 1985 led to a
boom in U.S. exports that, for the most part, was
unmatched by the export performance of the United States’
two main competitors. Total U.S. exports grew roughly
three times faster than German and Japanese exports, with
U.S. sales to the developing Asian markets faring well
against those of Japan and Germany. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, Japan’s sales to Mexico increased during this period
and its exporters performed better than U.S. firms in selling
to Europe. The success of Japanese firms in the latter half
of the 1980s was probably due in part to their heavy direct
investment in Mexico and Europe; the reliance of Japanese
operations abroad on imported capital goods and interme-
diate products from Japan also helped to boost exports.
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Export Volume Growth, 1980-97
Percentage Change
Latin America Europe
Total Developing Asia Canada Mexico (Excluding Mexico) (Excluding Germany)
1980-85
Germany 29 78 111 -10 -19 25
Japan 46 42 100 -11 -3 22
United States -16 -10 16 -21 -36 -27
1986-90
Germany 20 31 -17 22 3 51
Japan 17 56 6 64 -18 109
United States 62 123 54 83 29 86
1991-97
Germany 23 95 27 66 81 9
Japan 37 86 -18 59 102 8
United States 59 92 65 123  116 24
Memo:
Share of total exports, 1990
Germany 100 5 4 1 1 63
Japan 100 31 2 1 2 14
United States 100 15 21 7 7 22
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.
Notes: Export volume data are calculated by converting dollar export values into local currency terms and then deflating them by aggregate export price indexes for each
country. Data for 1997 are through September, annualized. Developing Asia includes all countries in Asia except Japan. Regional totals in the memo rows do not sum to
100 because exports to other areas of the world are not included.
By comparing U.S. export growth rates
to specific foreign markets with the export
growth rates of Japan and Germany
to the same markets, we obtain a more
accurate reading of the competitiveness
of U.S. exporters.The comparable export growth rates for all three coun-
tries during the 1990s suggest that our average index value for
this period of around 100 represents a neutral level—one
that does not give any country a significant price advantage
over the others. All three countries have done extremely
well in selling to developing Asia and all have done rela-
tively poorly in Europe, although U.S. firms have fared the
best there. In Latin America, U.S. and Japanese firms have
enjoyed fast growth, while German firms have had some-
what less success. U.S. firms have done substantially better
in Canada and Mexico, where the United States–Canada
Free Trade Agreement in 1989 and the subsequent North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 have
played a substantial role in boosting U.S. sales. Total U.S.
export growth in the 1990s has been higher than German
or Japanese growth because of these successful trade
liberalization efforts in North America.
The dollar’s rise in 1997 deserves special consideration.
In interpreting this rise, it may be useful to compare the
dollar’s sharp—though temporary—drop in 1995, when
our dollar index went below 90 in the second quarter of
the year. To determine whether the dollar’s weakness
derailed Japanese and German exports in 1995 and
1996, we examine the three countries’export volumes in
the 1990s to four major regions (Chart 3). Looking first
at developing Asia and Europe, we see that a modest
drop occurred in the growth of German and Japanese
exports relative to U.S. exports after 1994. Japan did
noticeably worse in Latin America while Germany and
Japan did poorly in Mexico and Canada, in part because
of NAFTA. In general, however, German and Japanese
firms largely managed to protect export sales during this
temporary fall in the dollar’s value, mainly by cutting
production costs and accepting lower profits in order to
minimize market share losses to U.S. firms.4 This
episode suggests that the dollar’s strength at the end of
1997, if sustained, will jeopardize U.S. competitiveness,
compelling U.S. firms to adopt strategies like those that
German and Japanese firms used to limit losses in 1995.
In sum, growth rates of U.S., German, and Japanese
exports to developing Asia, Latin America—and, to a
lesser extent, Europe—were similar from 1990 to 1997,
indicating at best modest price competitiveness gains
for U.S. firms in those regions when our dollar index
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Total U.S. export growth in the 1990s
has been higher than German or Japanese
growth because of successful trade
liberalization efforts in North America.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
hovered around 100. While overall U.S. export sales
were stronger than German or Japanese sales, the difference
is due largely to the removal of North American trade
barriers rather than a weak dollar.
Conclusion
There is little confusion over export competitiveness
when exchange rates move as they did in the 1980s. The
sharp run-up in the dollar squashed U.S. exports in the
first half of the decade, while the dollar’s reversal
enabled sales to surge in the second half.
In the 1990s, the effect of exchange rates on U.S.
price competitiveness has been much less dramatic. Our
trade-weighted dollar index shows that the dollar has
remained relatively stable for most of this period. A
comparison of U.S. export performance with that of the
nation’s major competitors suggests that the dollar has
not heavily influenced trade during this period. U.S.
export growth has been modestly better than that of
Germany and Japan, but NAFTA accounts for much of
this difference.
Looking forward, it is clear that the dollar’s rise in
1997, if sustained, will hurt U.S. price competitiveness.
To keep up with foreign firms, U.S. exporters will have
to pursue cost-cutting measures and perhaps accept
lower profit margins. Nevertheless, our trade-weighted
dollar index puts the recent rise in perspective. At the
end of 1997, the index was relatively high, but not sub-
stantially out of the bounds in which it had fluctuated
during the earlier part of the decade. Further sharp
increases in the dollar’s strength would be necessary to
push our index of price competitiveness to the high levels
of the mid-1980s.
Notes
1. Price indexes are used to compute real exchange rates.
Wholesale and producer price indexes are preferable to consumer
price indexes in these calculations: because consumer price indexes
include prices for services such as housing and medical care, they
are less relevant to trade flows. Nevertheless, the wider availability
of consumer price indexes internationally means that they are used
in some real exchange rate indexes.
2. The construction of trade-weighted exchange rate indexes is
discussed in greater detail in Turner and Van’t dack (1993).
3. In this section, “Latin America” excludes Mexico, “Europe”
excludes Germany, and “developing Asia” includes all countries in
Asia except Japan.
4. Relative export growth is not the only measure of competitive-
ness. Rising profitability of U.S. firms that compete internationally
can reasonably be judged as a gain in U.S. competitiveness.
Klitgaard (1996) notes that the yen’s appreciation in 1990-95 led to
steep declines in export prices, cutting into the profits of Japanese
firms—a signal of declining competitiveness—but sustaining the
firms’ export growth rates. If the criterion is profitability, Japanese
firms lost more from the yen’s rise in this period than is suggested
by export performance. However, while the notion of linking prof-
itability and competitiveness is appealing, practical considera-
tions—namely, that profits earned from export sales are generally
not reported separately either by U.S. or foreign firms—limit the
application of the concept in quantifying competitiveness. 
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